Geodesic
Measure of stability for a finite cooperative game with a parametric optimality principle (from Pareto to Nash)
Žurnal vyčislitelʹnoj matematiki i matematičeskoj fiziki, Tome 46 (2006) no. 7, pp. 1258-1264 
S. E. Bukhtoyarov; V. A. Emelichev. Measure of stability for a finite cooperative game with a parametric optimality principle (from Pareto to Nash). Žurnal vyčislitelʹnoj matematiki i matematičeskoj fiziki, Tome 46 (2006) no. 7, pp. 1258-1264. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/ZVMMF_2006_46_7_a9/
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Voir la notice de l'article provenant de la source Math-Net.Ru

A finite cooperative game in normal form is considered. Its optimality principle is specified with the help of a parameter such that Pareto optimality and Nash equilibrium correspond to two extreme parameter values. The limiting level of perturbations in the coefficients of payoff functions that do not give rise to new efficient situations is studied.

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