Geodesic
The comparative analysis of Nash’s equilibrium and Pareto-optimal set in non-antagonistic game with some aim points
Proceedings of the Yerevan State University. Physical and mathematical sciences, no. 3 (1987), pp. 30-36 
O. S. Mikaelyan. The comparative analysis of Nash’s equilibrium and Pareto-optimal set in non-antagonistic game with some aim points. Proceedings of the Yerevan State University. Physical and mathematical sciences, no. 3 (1987), pp. 30-36. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/UZERU_1987_3_a4/
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Voir la notice de l'article provenant de la source Math-Net.Ru

Many players differential non-coalition game with terminal prize has been considered. The players were using the piecewise program strategies memorizing the game prehistory. The comparative analysis of Pareto-optimal and Nash’s equilibrium situations have been presented. It has been proved that they are not covering each other. The obtained result has been illustrated by one concrete example.

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