A~uniform Tauberian theorem in dynamic games
    
    
  
  
  
      
      
      
        
Sbornik. Mathematics, Tome 209 (2018) no. 1, pp. 122-144
    
  
  
  
  
  
    
      
      
        
      
      
      
    Voir la notice de l'article provenant de la source Math-Net.Ru
            
              			Antagonistic dynamic games including games represented in normal form are considered. The asymptotic behaviour of value in these games is investigated as the game horizon tends to infinity (Cesàro mean) and as the discounting parameter tends to zero (Abel mean). The corresponding Abelian-Tauberian theorem is established: it is demonstrated that in both families the game value uniformly converges to the same limit, provided that at least one of the limits exists. Analogues of one-sided Tauberian theorems are obtained. An example shows that the requirements are essential even for control problems.
Bibliography: 31 titles.
			
            
            
            
          
        
      
                  
                    
                    
                    
                        
Keywords: 
dynamic programming principle, games with a saddle point, Tauberian theorem.
                    
                    
                    
                  
                
                
                @article{SM_2018_209_1_a5,
     author = {D. V. Khlopin},
     title = {A~uniform {Tauberian} theorem in dynamic games},
     journal = {Sbornik. Mathematics},
     pages = {122--144},
     publisher = {mathdoc},
     volume = {209},
     number = {1},
     year = {2018},
     language = {en},
     url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/SM_2018_209_1_a5/}
}
                      
                      
                    D. V. Khlopin. A~uniform Tauberian theorem in dynamic games. Sbornik. Mathematics, Tome 209 (2018) no. 1, pp. 122-144. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/SM_2018_209_1_a5/