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In this paper, I insist on two limits of the principle of charity. 1) The principle is supposed to help us solve the problem of the observational under-determination of our attributions of beliefs and desires. But it fails on that ground. The principle rules out attributions of beliefs and desires that are incompatible with the principle, but it cannot help us decide between incompatible attributions of beliefs and desires that are compatible with the principle; 2) Strong versions of the principle rule out the possibility of motivated irrationality. If one believes in the possibility of motivated irrationality, one cannot reasonably endorse strong versions of the principle of charity.
@article{PHSC_2002__6_2_109_0, author = {Ogien, Ruwen}, title = {Soyons charitables, mais pas trop~!}, journal = {Philosophia Scientiae}, pages = {109--125}, publisher = {\'Editions Kim\'e}, volume = {6}, number = {2}, year = {2002}, language = {fr}, url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/PHSC_2002__6_2_109_0/} }
Ogien, Ruwen. Soyons charitables, mais pas trop !. Philosophia Scientiae, L’usage anthropologique du principe de charité, Tome 6 (2002) no. 2, pp. 109-125. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/PHSC_2002__6_2_109_0/