Forcing future public ephemeral keys to attack authenticated key establishment protocols
Prikladnaâ diskretnaâ matematika, no. 4 (2024), pp. 60-77
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This paper studies the security of the authenticated key establishment protocols against the adversary who has the capability to force the participants to use of ephemeral public values. The paper substantiates the relevance of considering this capability, describes, in particular, attacks on the SIGMA, SIGMA-R, STS-MAC, Echinacea-3 protocols and the post-quantum BKM-KK protocol, and discusses the design features of protocols that allow to protect against attacks of this type.
Keywords:
cryptography, cryptographic protocol, authenticated key establishment, attack, forcing public ephemeral keys.
@article{PDM_2024_4_a5,
author = {E. K. Alekseev and S. N. Kyazhin and S. V. Smyshlyaev},
title = {Forcing future public ephemeral keys to attack authenticated key establishment protocols},
journal = {Prikladna\^a diskretna\^a matematika},
pages = {60--77},
publisher = {mathdoc},
number = {4},
year = {2024},
language = {ru},
url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/PDM_2024_4_a5/}
}
TY - JOUR AU - E. K. Alekseev AU - S. N. Kyazhin AU - S. V. Smyshlyaev TI - Forcing future public ephemeral keys to attack authenticated key establishment protocols JO - Prikladnaâ diskretnaâ matematika PY - 2024 SP - 60 EP - 77 IS - 4 PB - mathdoc UR - http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/PDM_2024_4_a5/ LA - ru ID - PDM_2024_4_a5 ER -
%0 Journal Article %A E. K. Alekseev %A S. N. Kyazhin %A S. V. Smyshlyaev %T Forcing future public ephemeral keys to attack authenticated key establishment protocols %J Prikladnaâ diskretnaâ matematika %D 2024 %P 60-77 %N 4 %I mathdoc %U http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/PDM_2024_4_a5/ %G ru %F PDM_2024_4_a5
E. K. Alekseev; S. N. Kyazhin; S. V. Smyshlyaev. Forcing future public ephemeral keys to attack authenticated key establishment protocols. Prikladnaâ diskretnaâ matematika, no. 4 (2024), pp. 60-77. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/PDM_2024_4_a5/