On security of the SESPAKE protocol
Prikladnaâ diskretnaâ matematika, no. 4 (2020), pp. 5-41
Voir la notice de l'article provenant de la source Math-Net.Ru
The Security Evaluated Standardized Password Authenticated Key Exchange (SESPAKE) protocol is standardized in Russia as R 50.1.115-2016. The current paper provides analysis of the protocol in relevant adversary models. We define new indistinguishability-based adversary model with a threat of false authentication that is an extension of the original indistinguishability-based model up to the case of protocols with authentication step without key diversification. We prove the protocol security in two adversary models with a classic threat of distinguishing a generated session key from a random string and with a threat of false authentication.
Keywords:
models and methods in information security, cryptographic protocols.
@article{PDM_2020_4_a0,
author = {E. K. Alekseev and S. V. Smyshlyaev},
title = {On security of the {SESPAKE} protocol},
journal = {Prikladna\^a diskretna\^a matematika},
pages = {5--41},
publisher = {mathdoc},
number = {4},
year = {2020},
language = {ru},
url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/PDM_2020_4_a0/}
}
E. K. Alekseev; S. V. Smyshlyaev. On security of the SESPAKE protocol. Prikladnaâ diskretnaâ matematika, no. 4 (2020), pp. 5-41. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/PDM_2020_4_a0/