Geodesic
An approach to construct a keyed PRF from the ``MAGMA'' block cipher
Prikladnaya Diskretnaya Matematika. Supplement, no. 16 (2023), pp. 105-110.

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On the basis of recently proposed results for AES, we present new construction, MAGMA-PRF, based on Russian standardized block cipher “MAGMA”. We show that MAGMA-PRF is secure against known attacks, which are applicable to plain “MAGMA”. We also show that MAGMA-PRF is secure in CTR, CTR-ACPKM, and GCM modes of operations, which, instantiated with PRF instead of PRP, are proven to have better cryptographic properties.
Keywords: block cipher, encryption modes, MAGMA-PRF, provable security.
Mots-clés : MAGMA 
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A. A. Shcherbachenko. An approach to construct a keyed PRF from the ``MAGMA'' block cipher. Prikladnaya Diskretnaya Matematika. Supplement, no. 16 (2023), pp. 105-110. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/PDMA_2023_16_a26/

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