Geodesic
About results of designing hierarchical representation of MROSL DP-model
Prikladnaya Diskretnaya Matematika. Supplement, no. 9 (2016), pp. 83-87.

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This article describes new approach to the hierarchical representation of mandatory entity-role DP-model of secure access and information flows control in OS of Linux set (MROSL DP-model). Existing “monolithic” description of MROSL DP-model is the basis of the access control mechanism in secure OS Astra Linux Special Edition. However, “monolithic” description of MROSL DP-model has considerable size and complexity. It is inconvenient for scientific analysis, verification and further development, as well as for its direct application in OS Astra Linux Special Edition. For this reason, a hierarchical representation of MROSL DP-model is completely revised, and we can describe it through its levels. Thus, each lower level of MROSL DP-model is an abstract system, whose elements are independent of the new elements belonging to a higher level of MROSL DP-model. When it is necessary, a higher level inherits, corrects or complements the lower level elements. There are four levels in this hierarchical representation of MROSL DP-model. First level corresponds to role-based access control (RBAC), second level – RBAC and mandatory integrity control (MIC), third level – RBAC, MIC and mandatory access control (MAC) with information flows by memory, and fourth level – RBAC, MIC and MAC with information flows by memory and by time. New levels of lateral “branches” may be added to MROSL DP-model in the future. Some alternative levels can be: alternative third level – RBAC, MIC and a model of hypervisor, or alternative fourth level – RBAC, MIC, MAC with information flows by memory and a model of RBAC in a network.
Keywords: computer security, formal model, hierarchical description
Mots-clés : Linux. 
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P. N. Devyanin. About results of designing hierarchical representation of MROSL DP-model. Prikladnaya Diskretnaya Matematika. Supplement, no. 9 (2016), pp. 83-87. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/PDMA_2016_9_a31/

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