On Epsilon-Cores of Cooperative Games with Fuzzy Payoffs
Matematičeskie zametki, Tome 110 (2021) no. 2, pp. 282-288
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It is well known that, for cooperative games with transferable utility (and with crisp payoffs), the set of reasonable imputations is nonempty. It is also known for what values of $\varepsilon$ the set of reasonable imputations belongs to the $\varepsilon$-core. Then the $\varepsilon$-core is also nonempty. This result is of considerable interest, because the 0-core of a cooperative game can be empty, but if the $\varepsilon$-core is nonempty in this case for some small $\varepsilon>0$, then there exist imputations such that the difference in the properties between them and the imputations from the 0-core is small. In this paper, these results are generalized to the case of games with fuzzy payoffs.
Keywords:
cooperative game, fuzzy number, reasonable imputation.
Mots-clés : epsilon-core
Mots-clés : epsilon-core
@article{MZM_2021_110_2_a9,
author = {A. S. Shvedov},
title = {On {Epsilon-Cores} of {Cooperative} {Games} with {Fuzzy} {Payoffs}},
journal = {Matemati\v{c}eskie zametki},
pages = {282--288},
publisher = {mathdoc},
volume = {110},
number = {2},
year = {2021},
language = {ru},
url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MZM_2021_110_2_a9/}
}
A. S. Shvedov. On Epsilon-Cores of Cooperative Games with Fuzzy Payoffs. Matematičeskie zametki, Tome 110 (2021) no. 2, pp. 282-288. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MZM_2021_110_2_a9/