Considering two MAC under SIG variants of the basic SIGMA protocol
Matematičeskie voprosy kriptografii, Tome 10 (2019) no. 2, pp. 145-158
Trieu Quang Phong. Considering two MAC under SIG variants of the basic SIGMA protocol. Matematičeskie voprosy kriptografii, Tome 10 (2019) no. 2, pp. 145-158. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MVK_2019_10_2_a12/
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Voir la notice de l'article provenant de la source Math-Net.Ru

In this paper we consider two variants of the basic SIGMA protocol in which the MAC tag is not sent separately but rather it is computed under the signature operation. As a consequence, both these variants are secure in the Canetti–Krawczyk “post-specified peer” model.

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