Geodesic
Models of state inspections organization and struggle against corruption
Matematičeskoe modelirovanie, Tome 22 (2010) no. 4, pp. 67-89.

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We consider several problems of optimal organization for revenue collecting and law enforcement inspections. The strategy includes: selection of agents for the primary audit and revisions, salaries and premiums of inspectors at different levels, the number of levels in the hierarchy. In every case we determine the optimal strategy of inspection organization depending on parameters of the model.
Mots-clés : corruption
Keywords: state inspections, optimal organization. 
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A. A. Vasin; P. A. Kartunova; A. S. Urazov. Models of state inspections organization and struggle against corruption. Matematičeskoe modelirovanie, Tome 22 (2010) no. 4, pp. 67-89. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MM_2010_22_4_a4/

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