Geodesic
Game models of network auctions and their laboratory researches
Matematičeskoe modelirovanie, Tome 21 (2009) no. 8, pp. 63-79.

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It is proposed to use the cooperative games theory for the analysis of results of network auctions. The main properties of the cooperative games which model the network markets, such as superadditivity, non-emptiness of the core, convexity are investigated. By means of the theory of cooperative games one of the laboratory network markets, being object of research of the Laboratory of experimental economics of MIPT and CCRAS is analyzed. 
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I. Menshikov; V. Platonov. Game models of network auctions and their laboratory researches. Matematičeskoe modelirovanie, Tome 21 (2009) no. 8, pp. 63-79. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MM_2009_21_8_a5/

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