Geodesic
Nash equilibrium in environmental problems
Matematičeskoe modelirovanie, Tome 18 (2006) no. 5, pp. 73-90.

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A dynamic game model of bioresource management problem (fish catching) is considered. The center (state), which determines a share of prohibited for catching (reserved) area of a reservoir, and the players (fishing firms), which make fish catching are the participants of this game. Each player is independent decision maker, being guided by maximization of the profit of fish sale. In traditional statement center's objective is catch regulation by introduction quotas on fishing. In this paper the center's task is the choice of optimal share of reserved territory for maintenance of stable population development in a reservoir in long-term prospect and possible fishing level's definition, sufficient for demand satisfaction. 
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V. V. Mazalov; A. N. Rettieva. Nash equilibrium in environmental problems. Matematičeskoe modelirovanie, Tome 18 (2006) no. 5, pp. 73-90. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MM_2006_18_5_a7/

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