Geodesic
On the optimal distribution of informational resources in the electoral campaign
Matematičeskoe modelirovanie, Tome 16 (2004) no. 8, pp. 24-38 
A. A. Vasin; Yu. V. Sosina. On the optimal distribution of informational resources in the electoral campaign. Matematičeskoe modelirovanie, Tome 16 (2004) no. 8, pp. 24-38. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MM_2004_16_8_a1/
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Voir la notice de l'article provenant de la source Math-Net.Ru

The political institutes, such as a parliament, play the important role in maintaining of social processes in Russia (on the federal and regional rate) and in many other countries. The forming of such institutes is the result of electoral competition. So, the problem of the optimal distribution of informational resources is of great interest for different political subjects. The present paper considers this problem from the point of view of two players: Power, that is the political group that controls the government at the time of election, and Opposition, whose interests are contrary to the interests of Power. Power aims are to get certain share of votes in order to maintain its control over the government and push the desirable laws through the parliament. The paper studies the corresponding optimization problems and games.

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