Geodesic
Models of optimal organization of the tax inspection
Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 16 (2024) no. 3, pp. 14-26.

Voir la notice de l'article provenant de la source Math-Net.Ru

The problem of optimal organization of the state inspection with an honest head and rational inspectors is considered. The audit schemes are being investigated, in which the honest behavior of taxpayers and auditors turns out to be resistant to deviations from their coalitions. In addition to hierarchical structures, a three-stage scheme with cross-checking is considered. It has been proven that cross-checking is never optimal. The minimum audit costs for 2- and 3-level structures have been determined. The best option is specified depending on the model parameters.
Mots-clés : corruption
Keywords: hierarchical structures, game-theoretic models. 
@article{MGTA_2024_16_3_a1,
     author = {Alexander A. Vasin and Nikita I. Tsyganov},
     title = {Models of optimal organization of the tax inspection},
     journal = {Matemati\v{c}eska\^a teori\^a igr i e\"e prilo\v{z}eni\^a},
     pages = {14--26},
     publisher = {mathdoc},
     volume = {16},
     number = {3},
     year = {2024},
     language = {ru},
     url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2024_16_3_a1/}
}
TY  - JOUR
AU  - Alexander A. Vasin
AU  - Nikita I. Tsyganov
TI  - Models of optimal organization of the tax inspection
JO  - Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ
PY  - 2024
SP  - 14
EP  - 26
VL  - 16
IS  - 3
PB  - mathdoc
UR  - http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2024_16_3_a1/
LA  - ru
ID  - MGTA_2024_16_3_a1
ER  - 
%0 Journal Article
%A Alexander A. Vasin
%A Nikita I. Tsyganov
%T Models of optimal organization of the tax inspection
%J Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ
%D 2024
%P 14-26
%V 16
%N 3
%I mathdoc
%U http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2024_16_3_a1/
%G ru
%F MGTA_2024_16_3_a1
Alexander A. Vasin; Nikita I. Tsyganov. Models of optimal organization of the tax inspection. Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 16 (2024) no. 3, pp. 14-26. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2024_16_3_a1/

[1] Babichev N.V., “Modelirovanie vzaimodeistviya tamozhennykh organov i uchastnikov vneshneekonomicheskoi deyatelnosti, uklonyayuschikhsya ot uplaty tamozhennykh platezhei”, Vestnik AGTU. Ser.: Ekonomika, 2010, no. 2, 113–117

[2] Vasin A.A., Morozov V.V., Vvedenie v teoriyu igr s prilozheniyami k ekonomike, ucheb. posobie, M., 2003

[3] Vasin A.A., Gurvich V.A., “Koalitsionnye situatsii ravnovesiya v metaigrakh”, Vestnik MGU. Cer. 15. Vychislitelnaya matematika i kibernetika, 1980, no. 3, 38–44 | Zbl

[4] Vasin A.A., Nekooperativnye igry v prirode i obschestve, MAKS press, M., 2005

[5] Vasin A.A., Sivachenko A.D., “Ob optimalnoi organizatsii trekhurovnevoi inspektsii”, Sb. Lomonosovskie chteniya-2024, nauch. konf., Tezisy dokladov. Ser.: Vychislitelnaya matematika i kibernetika (fak-t VMK MGU), MAKS press, M., 2024, 39–41

[6] Gubar E.A., Zhitkova E.M., Kumacheva S.Sh., Tomilina G.A., “Modelirovanie protsessov vozdeistviya informatsii o proverkakh na risk-statusy i ukloneniya nalogoplatelschikov”, Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta. Ser. 10: Prikladnaya matematika. Informatika. Protsessy upravleniya, 15:2 (2019), 245–258 | MR

[7] Bernheim B.D. , Peleg B., Whinston M.D., “Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts”, Journal of Economic Theory, 42:1 (1987), 1–12 | DOI | MR | Zbl

[8] Chandler P., Wilde L., “Corruption in tax administration”, Journal of Public Economics, 49 (1992), 333–349 | DOI

[9] Keren M., Levhari D., “The Internal Organization of the Firm and the Shape of Average Costs”, Bell J. of Economics, 14:2 (1983), 474–486 | DOI | MR

[10] Kolokoltsov V.N., Malafeyev O.A., Many Agent Games in Socio-economic Systems: Corruption, Inspection, Coalition Building, Network Growth, Security, Springer Series in Operations Research and Financial Engineering, 2019 | DOI | MR | Zbl

[11] Kolokoltsov V.N., Malafeyev O.A., “Mean-Field-Game Model of Corruption”, Dyn. Games Appl., 7 (2017), 34–47 | DOI | MR | Zbl

[12] Qian Y., “Incentives and Loss of Control in an Optimal Hierarchy”, Rev. of Economic Studies, 61:3 (1994), 27–44 | DOI | MR

[13] Sanchez I., Sobel J., “Hierarchical design and enforcement of income tax polices”, Journal of Public Economics, 26 (1985), 1–18 | DOI

[14] Ugol'nitskii G.A., Usov A.B., “Dynamic Models For Coordinating Private and Public Interests in Economic Corruption”, J. Comput. Syst. Sci. Int., 59 (2020), 39–48 | DOI | MR | Zbl

[15] Vasin A.A., Nikolaev P.V., Urazov A.S., “Optimal organization of an inspection structure”, Dokl. Math., 85 (2012), 428–431 | DOI | MR | Zbl

[16] Vasin A., Nikolaev P., Urazov A., “IT for Corruption Suppression”, Procedia Computer Science, 2013, no. 17, 1097–1102 | DOI