Geodesic
Approximate equilibrium in a finitely repeated ``Prisoner's dilemma''
Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 16 (2024) no. 2, pp. 45-65.

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The paper studies finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. To maintain cooperation in the game, a new profile of behavioral strategies is proposed, where the deviation of a player is not punished until the end of the game, but for a given number of stages depending on the stage of the game. The existence of an approximate equilibrium in these strategies is proven, and the maximum value of benefit of a player deviating from the approximate equilibrium is found.
Keywords: repeated games, prisoner's dilemma, approximate equilibrium, trigger strategy. 
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Alena M. Pisareva; Elena M. Parilina. Approximate equilibrium in a finitely repeated ``Prisoner's dilemma''. Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 16 (2024) no. 2, pp. 45-65. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2024_16_2_a3/

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