Geodesic
Coalition Pareto-optimal solution in a nontransferable game
Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 16 (2024) no. 1, pp. 12-43.

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By the end of the last century, four directions had been established in the mathematical theory of differential positional games (DPI): a non-coalition version of DPI, a cooperative, hierarchical and, finally, the least studied, a coalition version of DPI. In turn, within the coalition, there are usually games with transferable payoffs (with side payments, when players can share their winnings during the game) and nontransferable winnings (games with side payments, when such redistributions are absent for one reason or another). Studies of coalition games with side payments are concentrated and actively conducted at the Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Management Processes of St. Petersburg State University and Institute of Applied Mathematical Research of the Karelian Research Centre of RAS (Professors L,A. Petrosyan, V. V. Mazalov, E. M. Parilina, A. N. Rettieva and their numerous domestic and foreign students). However, side payments are not always present even in economic interactions, moreover, side payments may be generally prohibited by law. The studies we have undertaken in recent years on the balance of threats and counter-threats (sanctions and counter-sanctions) in non-coalition differential games allow, in our opinion, to cover some aspects of the non-transferable version of coalition games. This article is devoted to the issues of internal and external stability of coalitions in the DPI class. It reveals the coefficient constraints in the mathematical model of the differential positional linear-quadratic game of six persons with a two-coalition structure, in which this coalition structure is internally and externally stable.
Keywords: Nash equilibrium, balance of threats and counter-threats, Pareto optimality, efficiency
Mots-clés : coalition. 
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Vladislav I. Zhukovskiy; Lidiya V. Zhukovskaya; Lidiya V. Smirnova. Coalition Pareto-optimal solution in a nontransferable game. Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 16 (2024) no. 1, pp. 12-43. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2024_16_1_a1/

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