Geodesic
Game-theoretic analysis of the interaction of economic agents in the Cournot oligopoly, taking into account the linear structure, the ''green'' effect and concern for fairness
Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 15 (2023) no. 1, pp. 3-47.

Voir la notice de l'article provenant de la source Math-Net.Ru

A comparative analysis of the effectiveness of various ways of organizing economic agents is carried out, taking into account the structure and regulations of their interaction in the models of the Cournot oligopoly. Cournot oligopoly models in the form of a supply chain are constructed and analytically investigated, taking into account the "green" effect and concern for fairness. For symmetric models of Cournot oligopoly with different ways of organizing economic agents, the matching structures of social and individual preferences are analytically obtained. A numerical study of Cournot oligopoly models in various forms with asymmetric agents has been carried out, and the corresponding structures of social and individual preferences have been obtained.
Mots-clés : Cournot oligopoly
Keywords: supply chain, fairnessconcern, green effect, symmetrical and asymmetrical agents. 
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Olga I. Gorbaneva; Gennady A. Ougolnitsky. Game-theoretic analysis of the interaction of economic agents in the Cournot oligopoly, taking into account the linear structure, the ''green'' effect and concern for fairness. Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 15 (2023) no. 1, pp. 3-47. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2023_15_1_a0/

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