Geodesic
Attack against layered defense
Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 14 (2022) no. 4, pp. 69-80.

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The "attack-defense" model is considered, in which the defense party at each point of defense has several lines and uses the target allocation of its forces. The problem of minimizing the mean quantity of attack forces breaking through the defense lines is solved in explicit formulae. Algorithm of finding a solution of the zero-sum damage game is developed.
Keywords: "attack-defense" model, target allocation, zero-sum game, optimal strategies, value of the game. 
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     author = {Vladimir V. Morozov},
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Vladimir V. Morozov. Attack against layered defense. Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 14 (2022) no. 4, pp. 69-80. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2022_14_4_a3/

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