Geodesic
A model of a two-level hierarchical system with non-cooperative behavior of lower-level elements
Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 14 (2022) no. 4, pp. 45-68 Cet article a éte moissonné depuis la source Math-Net.Ru

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One of the possible generalizations for the case of many persons of the classical hierarchical Germeier game is investigated. It is assumed that lower-level players tend to Nash equilibrium situations. The solution of the corresponding problem for games without feedback is given. An example is constructed demonstrating the fundamental difficulties encountered in the study of a game with feedback. A meaningful example is considered in which the proposed constructions adequately describe reality.
Keywords: hierarchical games, maximal guaranteed result, Nash equilibrium. 
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Mikhail A. Gorelov. A model of a two-level hierarchical system with non-cooperative behavior of lower-level elements. Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 14 (2022) no. 4, pp. 45-68. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2022_14_4_a2/

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