Geodesic
Two-stage game-theoretic model of inspection and embezzlement in a three-level control system
Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 14 (2022) no. 3, pp. 45-74.

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The subhierarchical two-stage game-theoretic model of embezzlement and bribery is designed, the particular example based on the scheme with six officials on three levels is solved. Theoretic conditions and numerical corruption minimization settings are suggested. The cooperative extension is proposed and the computer simulation is carried out for two different approaches to the isolated components, the results analyzed for stability.
Mots-clés : corruption, inspection, core
Keywords: embezzlement, hierarchical game, bribery, cooperative games, Myerson value. 
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Suriya Sh. Kumacheva; Ivan M. Orlov. Two-stage game-theoretic model of inspection and embezzlement in a three-level control system. Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 14 (2022) no. 3, pp. 45-74. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2022_14_3_a2/

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