Geodesic
Sequential equilibria in signaling games
Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 14 (2022) no. 1, pp. 3-20.

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The paper considers Bayesian multi-stage signaling games. Previously formulated for extensive-form games, concepts of sequential equilibrium, separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium are specified, and calculating methods for these equilibria are also discussed. A competitive collision model with signals indicating rivals’ states is studied as a specific example. We determine conditions for existence of separating and pooling equilibria with ordered competition, in which the competition object goes to one of the rivals without a rigid encounter. Model parameters ranges of the equilibria existence are also determined.
Keywords: multi-stage game, signaling game, ordered competition, separating equilibrium, pooling equilibrium. 
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Alexander A. Vasin; Irina Yu. Seregina. Sequential equilibria in signaling games. Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 14 (2022) no. 1, pp. 3-20. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2022_14_1_a0/

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