Hierarchical games with additive payoff functions combining public and private interests

Victor A. Gorelik ; Tatiana V. Zolotova

Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 13 (2021) no. 4, pp. 3-17.

Résumé

The paper proposes a game-theoretic model with linear-quadratic payoff functions, which are additive convolutions of two criteria describing public and personal interests. This game has good properties, in particular, the independence of the leader's strategy in the Stackelberg equilibrium from the parameters of the follower's function. This property means that the leader does not need information about the follower's objective function, which in reality is difficult to obtain, and his strategy has the property of robustness.

Détail

Keywords: hierarchical game, Stackelberg equilibrium, Nash equilibrium, public goods, linear-quadratic payoff function.

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