Corruption mechanisms in models of social and private interests combining engine in the case of one agent. Optimization approach

Olga I. Gorbaneva

Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 12 (2020) no. 2, pp. 36-62.

Résumé

The paper is devoted to the investigation of corruption in models of social and private interests combining (SPICE-models) in the case of one agent. The specific attention in the article is given to the optimization approach investigation. In the structure of model between the higher level (principal) and the lower levels (agents) element «supervisor» is included. Supervisor acts in interests of principal, but he can weaken principal's demands for agent in exchange of a bribe. Administrative and economic corruption mechanisms are introduced and investigated. Optimization approach is applied.

Détail

Keywords: SPICE-models, corruption mechanisms, system compatibility, administrative and economic corruption, descriptive approach, optimization approach.

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