Geodesic
Normative conspiracy theory
Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 12 (2020) no. 1, pp. 33-59.

Voir la notice de l'article provenant de la source Math-Net.Ru

Author introduces new model based on correlated extension of normal form games, aiming to describe player behavior in environments that allow information asymmetry arising from different capabilities to privately coordinate strategies.
Keywords: matrix $n$-player games, correlated strategies, non-binding secret agreements. 
@article{MGTA_2020_12_1_a2,
     author = {Maxim A. Savchenko},
     title = {Normative conspiracy theory},
     journal = {Matemati\v{c}eska\^a teori\^a igr i e\"e prilo\v{z}eni\^a},
     pages = {33--59},
     publisher = {mathdoc},
     volume = {12},
     number = {1},
     year = {2020},
     language = {ru},
     url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2020_12_1_a2/}
}
TY  - JOUR
AU  - Maxim A. Savchenko
TI  - Normative conspiracy theory
JO  - Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ
PY  - 2020
SP  - 33
EP  - 59
VL  - 12
IS  - 1
PB  - mathdoc
UR  - http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2020_12_1_a2/
LA  - ru
ID  - MGTA_2020_12_1_a2
ER  - 
%0 Journal Article
%A Maxim A. Savchenko
%T Normative conspiracy theory
%J Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ
%D 2020
%P 33-59
%V 12
%N 1
%I mathdoc
%U http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2020_12_1_a2/
%G ru
%F MGTA_2020_12_1_a2
Maxim A. Savchenko. Normative conspiracy theory. Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 12 (2020) no. 1, pp. 33-59. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2020_12_1_a2/

[1] Bogachev V. I., Osnovy teorii mery, v. 1, NITs «Regulyarnaya i khaoticheskaya dinamika», M.–Izhevsk, 2003

[2] Kolmogorov A. N., Osnovnye ponyatiya teorii veroyatnostei, 2-e izd., Nauka, M., 1974

[3] Nikolenko S. I., Teoriya ekonomicheskikh mekhanizmov, uchebnoe posobie, INTUIT.RU: BINOM. Laboratoriya znanii, M., 2009

[4] Engelking R., Obschaya topologiya, Mir, M., 1986 | MR

[5] Aumann R. J., “Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies”, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1:1 (1974), 67–96 | DOI | MR | Zbl

[6] Bernheim B. D., Peleg B., Whinston M. D., “Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts”, Journal of Economic Theory, 42:1 (1987), 1–12 | DOI | MR | Zbl

[7] Boros E., Gurvich V., Vasin A., “Stable families of coalitions and normal hypergraphs”, Mathematical Social Sciences, 34:2 (1997), 107–123 | DOI | MR | Zbl

[8] Dhillon A., Mertens J. F., “Perfect Correlated Equilibria”, Journal of Economic Theory, 68:2 (1996), 279–302 | DOI | MR | Zbl

[9] Hart S., Mas-Colell A., “A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium”, Econometrica, 68:5 (2000), 1127–1150 | DOI | MR | Zbl

[10] Myerson R. B., “Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems”, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 10:1 (1982), 67–81 | DOI | MR | Zbl