Geodesic
Individual stability of coalition structures in three-person games
Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 11 (2019) no. 1, pp. 73-95.

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Cooperative games with coalition structures are considered and a principle of coalition structure individual stability with respect to some cooperative solution concepts is determined. In comparison with the paper (Sedakov et al., 2013), we consider the opportunity of the players to block the deviation of a player in case their payoffs decrease with the deviation. We prove the existence of an individually stable coalition structure with respect to the Shapley and equal surplus division values for the case of three-person games according to the new definition of a stable coalition structure.
Mots-clés : coalition structure
Keywords: stability, the Shapley value, the ES-value. 
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Fengyan Sun; Elena M. Parilina; Hongwei Gao. Individual stability of coalition structures in three-person games. Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 11 (2019) no. 1, pp. 73-95. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2019_11_1_a3/

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