Geodesic
Evolutionary methods for solving dynamic resourse allocation problems
Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 10 (2018) no. 1, pp. 5-22.

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The paper proposes a dynamic game-theoretic statement of the problem of resource allocation in the organizational system. The application of algorithms of evolutionary modeling to the solution of such problems is considered. The exposition is illustrated by model examples.
Keywords: dynamic resource allocation problem, differential games, evolutionary modeling. 
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Grigory I. Beliavsky; Natalia V. Danilova; Gennady A. Ougolnitsky. Evolutionary methods for solving dynamic resourse allocation problems. Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 10 (2018) no. 1, pp. 5-22. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2018_10_1_a0/

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