On the existence of IDP-core in cooperative differential games

Dmitry A. Wolf ; Victor V. Zakharov ; Ovanes L. Petrosian

Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 9 (2017) no. 4, pp. 18-38.

Résumé

In this paper we consider differential games with transferable utility and study of non-emptiness property of IDP-core presented in [7]. We apply methods of linear programming first applied in the paper [23] for analyzing non-emptiness of the Core. With described methods we construct necessary and sufficient conditions for IDP-core to be non-empty. This conditions are formalized for each time instant on which the game is defined and are imposed on a set of imputation distribution procedures (IDPs) corresponding to IDP-core.

Détail

Keywords: cooperative differential games, cooperative games, IDP-core, SC-core, linear programming.

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