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@article{MGTA_2017_9_1_a2, author = {Sergei I. Dotsenko and Anna A. Ivashko}, title = {On the model of the best bilateral two-stage mutual choice}, journal = {Matemati\v{c}eska\^a teori\^a igr i e\"e prilo\v{z}eni\^a}, pages = {45--61}, publisher = {mathdoc}, volume = {9}, number = {1}, year = {2017}, language = {ru}, url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2017_9_1_a2/} }
TY - JOUR AU - Sergei I. Dotsenko AU - Anna A. Ivashko TI - On the model of the best bilateral two-stage mutual choice JO - Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ PY - 2017 SP - 45 EP - 61 VL - 9 IS - 1 PB - mathdoc UR - http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2017_9_1_a2/ LA - ru ID - MGTA_2017_9_1_a2 ER -
Sergei I. Dotsenko; Anna A. Ivashko. On the model of the best bilateral two-stage mutual choice. Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 9 (2017) no. 1, pp. 45-61. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2017_9_1_a2/
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