Geodesic
Game-teoretic model of agreement on limitation of transboundary atmospheric pollution
Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 9 (2017) no. 1, pp. 27-44.

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In this article we consider a model of the agreements in the problem of transboundary atmospheric pollution by emissions of industrial production. Interaction of countries is described as a repeated game with side payments. The aim of this work is to find the conditions for existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium realizing Pareto-optimal situation in each period of the game.
Keywords: repeated game, Nash equilibrium
Mots-clés : subgame perfect equilibrium, Pareto-optimal situation. 
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Alexandr A. Vasin; Anastasiya G. Divtsova. Game-teoretic model of agreement on limitation of transboundary atmospheric pollution. Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 9 (2017) no. 1, pp. 27-44. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2017_9_1_a1/

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