Geodesic
Static models of concordance of private and public interests in resource allocation
Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 8 (2016) no. 2, pp. 28-57.

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Conditions of system compatibility in the models of resource allocation between private and public activity are analyzed. Economic and administrative control mechanisms of the system compatibility are described.
Keywords: control mechanisms, hierarchical games, resource allocation, system compatibility. 
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Olga I. Gorbaneva; Guennady A. Ougolnitsky. Static models of concordance of private and public interests in resource allocation. Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 8 (2016) no. 2, pp. 28-57. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2016_8_2_a1/

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