Geodesic
Pareto-equilibrium strategy profile
Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 7 (2015) no. 1, pp. 74-91.

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In the article the strategy profiles that are the Pareto-optimal the Nash equilibriums are considered. Sufficient conditions for existence of the equilibrium for the pure strategies are found. These conditions use the Germier convolutions of the utility functions. For non-cooperative games with compact strategy sets and with continuous utility functions existence of the Pareto-optimal Nash equilibriums in mixed strategies is proved.
Keywords: non-cooperative game, mixed strategies, Nash equilibrium, Pareto optimums. 
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Vladislav I. Zhukovskiy; Konstantin N. Kudryavtsev. Pareto-equilibrium strategy profile. Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 7 (2015) no. 1, pp. 74-91. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2015_7_1_a4/

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