Geodesic
Equilibrium in transportation game
Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 6 (2014) no. 1, pp. 41-55 
Anna V. Melnik. Equilibrium in transportation game. Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 6 (2014) no. 1, pp. 41-55. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2014_6_1_a2/
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     author = {Anna V. Melnik},
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     url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2014_6_1_a2/}
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Voir la notice de l'article provenant de la source Math-Net.Ru

A non-cooperative $m$-person transportation game which is related to the queueing system $M/M/m$ on graph is considered. There are $m$ services (transport companies) which serve the stream of customers with exponential distribution with parameters $\mu_i$ $i=1,2,\ldots,m$. The stream forms the Poisson process with matrix of intensities $\Lambda$. The solution of the problem of pricing and determining the optimal intensity for each firm in the competition is derived.

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