Geodesic
Discrete-time bioresorce management problem with asymmetric players
Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 5 (2013) no. 3, pp. 72-87 Cet article a éte moissonné depuis la source Math-Net.Ru

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Discrete-time game-theoretic model related to a bioresource management problem (fish catching) is investigated. The players (countries or fishing firms) which harvest the fish stock are the participants of the game. Players differ in their time preferences and use different discount factors. The main goal here is to construct the value function for the cooperative solution and to distribute the joint payoff among the players. We propose to use recursive Nash bargaining solution in order to determine cooperative behavior. We present two different approaches of bargaining procedure: as a solution for the hole game or as a solution on each time step.
Keywords: bioresource management problem, asymmetric players, Nash bargaining solution. 
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     author = {Anna N. Rettieva},
     title = {Discrete-time bioresorce management problem with asymmetric players},
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     url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2013_5_3_a3/}
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Anna N. Rettieva. Discrete-time bioresorce management problem with asymmetric players. Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 5 (2013) no. 3, pp. 72-87. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2013_5_3_a3/

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