Geodesic
Dynamic hierarchical play two persons in programme strategy and their exhibits
Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 5 (2013) no. 2, pp. 82-104.

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The private classes of the differential hierarchical games of two players in programming strategies are considered in this article. Their interpretation is given as models to corruptions and controls of the sustainable development in hierarchical systems. The optimum principles for these classes of the games as modifications of the Stackelberg balance are formulate. The algorithms of the construction balance of these games are offered. These algorithms are approved on numeric examples.
Keywords: dynamic games, hierarchical systems, Stackelberg balance, sustainable development.
Mots-clés : corruption 
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Gennady A. Ougolnitsky; Anatoliy B. Usov. Dynamic hierarchical play two persons in programme strategy and their exhibits. Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 5 (2013) no. 2, pp. 82-104. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2013_5_2_a3/

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