Geodesic
The bargaining solution among threshold strategies
Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 5 (2013) no. 2, pp. 46-63.

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We consider a bargaining problem which engages a seller (player $I$) and a buyer (player $II$). Each player possesses private information about own reservation price which is unavailable to the opponent. Players appear on the market and announce their prices for a product. If the transaction takes place then the gain of a player is the difference between the negotiated and the reservation prices. We find the equilibrium in this game among threshold strategies
Keywords: bargaining model, threshold strategies, Bayes equilibrium. 
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Vladimir V. Mazalov; Aleksei Y. Kondratev. The bargaining solution among threshold strategies. Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 5 (2013) no. 2, pp. 46-63. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2013_5_2_a1/

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