Geodesic
A model of electoral behaviour
Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 5 (2013) no. 1, pp. 3-26.

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We study a model of electoral behavior on mass elections (for example, parlamentary). There are some important features of these elections that may affect the voter's incentive to participate: 1) no one knows a priori how many voters a going to participate; 2) the number of candidates is considerably smaller than the number of voters and each particular voter seems to have little chance to affect the results of the election. Another issue that affects the turnout is that participation in the election involves certain costs for each voter regardless of their results. We investigate the problem of voting reasonability using the game theory methods. We assume two groups of voters with fixed quantities. Members of each group support their candidate and vote for him only. The strategy of each voter is to participate or not in the election. We study the existence and number of pure and mixed strategy equilibria.
Keywords: voting paradoxes, Nash equilibrium, mixed strategies, deciding vote. 
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Sergey A. Vartanov. A model of electoral behaviour. Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 5 (2013) no. 1, pp. 3-26. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2013_5_1_a0/

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