Geodesic
Game-theoretic model of agents' interaction in a two-stage market with a random factor
Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 4 (2012) no. 4, pp. 3-22 Cet article a éte moissonné depuis la source Math-Net.Ru

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We examine a game-theoretic model of a two-stage market with arbitrageurs. Arbitrageurs are risk-neutral and operate in the conditions of perfect competition. A random factor affects the outcome in the spot market. Thus, the spot price is a random value. We determine the optimal strategies for consumers, producers, and arbitrageurs. We analyze the dependence of producers' market power on parameters of the model. The results show that introduction of the forward market substantially reduces the market power of producers.
Keywords: forward market
Mots-clés : subgame perfect equilibrium, Cournot oligopoly. 
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Alexander A. Vasin; Ekaterina A. Daylova. Game-theoretic model of agents' interaction in a two-stage market with a random factor. Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 4 (2012) no. 4, pp. 3-22. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2012_4_4_a0/

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