The present and future of game theory

Martin Shubik

Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 4 (2012) no. 1, pp. 93-116.

Résumé

A broad nontechnical coverage of many of the developments in game theory since the 1950s is given together with some comments on important open problems and where some of the developments may take place. The nearly 90 references given serve only as a minimal guide to the many thousands of books and articles that have been written. The purpose here is to present a broad brush picture of the many areas of study and application that have come into being. The use of deep techniques flourishes best when it stays in touch with application. There is a vital symbiotic relationship between good theory and practice. The breakneck speed of development of game theory calls for an appreciation of both the many realities of conflict, coordination and cooperation and the abstract investigation of all of them.

Détail

Keywords: game theory, application and theory, law, experimental gaming, conflict, coordination and cooperation.
Mots-clés : social sciences

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