On the secession-stability of Nash equilibria in the model of endogenous coalition formation
Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 4 (2012) no. 1, pp. 3-20
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We study a model of endogenous coalition formation by players (agents) from large societies. Each agent's preferences are described by his ideal point, while the agents are distributed on the ideal points set according to some rule. The coalition policy is determined as a median of its members ideal points distribution. The payoff of an agent depends on the distance between his ideal point and the policy of the coalition he joins and on the size of this coalition. We assume that the agents distribution has monotonous or unimodal density function. We examine the sufficient and necessary conditions for the Nash equilibria to be stable in regard to secession.
Mots-clés :
coalition formation
Keywords: Nash equilibrium, local stability.
Keywords: Nash equilibrium, local stability.
@article{MGTA_2012_4_1_a0,
author = {Sergey A. Vartanov},
title = {On the secession-stability of {Nash} equilibria in the model of endogenous coalition formation},
journal = {Matemati\v{c}eska\^a teori\^a igr i e\"e prilo\v{z}eni\^a},
pages = {3--20},
publisher = {mathdoc},
volume = {4},
number = {1},
year = {2012},
language = {ru},
url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2012_4_1_a0/}
}
TY - JOUR AU - Sergey A. Vartanov TI - On the secession-stability of Nash equilibria in the model of endogenous coalition formation JO - Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ PY - 2012 SP - 3 EP - 20 VL - 4 IS - 1 PB - mathdoc UR - http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2012_4_1_a0/ LA - ru ID - MGTA_2012_4_1_a0 ER -
Sergey A. Vartanov. On the secession-stability of Nash equilibria in the model of endogenous coalition formation. Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 4 (2012) no. 1, pp. 3-20. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2012_4_1_a0/