Geodesic
Threshold models of reciprocal insurance
Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 3 (2011) no. 4, pp. 3-22.

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Gaming models of reciprocal insurance is considered. In the gaming profile there is a choice of a player to take part or not to take part in reciprocal insurance funding. Behavior of a player depends upon her risk aversion. Through the scalar parameter of risk aversion partition function is defined. This partition function results in threshold behavior of the players. Anonymous and non-anonymous gambling models are considered. For both models the conditions of Nash equilibrium are found. 
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Vladimir V. Breer; Dmitrii A. Novikov. Threshold models of reciprocal insurance. Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 3 (2011) no. 4, pp. 3-22. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2011_3_4_a0/

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