Threshold models of reciprocal insurance
Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 3 (2011) no. 4, pp. 3-22
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Gaming models of reciprocal insurance is considered. In the gaming profile there is a choice of a player to take part or not to take part in reciprocal insurance funding. Behavior of a player depends upon her risk aversion. Through the scalar parameter of risk aversion partition function is defined. This partition function results in threshold behavior of the players. Anonymous and non-anonymous gambling models are considered. For both models the conditions of Nash equilibrium are found.
@article{MGTA_2011_3_4_a0,
author = {Vladimir V. Breer and Dmitrii A. Novikov},
title = {Threshold models of reciprocal insurance},
journal = {Matemati\v{c}eska\^a teori\^a igr i e\"e prilo\v{z}eni\^a},
pages = {3--22},
publisher = {mathdoc},
volume = {3},
number = {4},
year = {2011},
language = {ru},
url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2011_3_4_a0/}
}
Vladimir V. Breer; Dmitrii A. Novikov. Threshold models of reciprocal insurance. Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 3 (2011) no. 4, pp. 3-22. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2011_3_4_a0/