Geodesic
Two types of players in the endogenous coalition formation model
Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 2 (2010) no. 2, pp. 79-98 Cet article a éte moissonné depuis la source Math-Net.Ru

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A model of coalition formation by players whose payoff depends on the value of the parameter (e.g., geographical location, bliss point) is considered. In this model a small portion of the new players with a different payoff function is injected into the main population. This paper considers different types of coalition stability and for each describes corresponding stability criteria. The derived conditions are then compared with the similar criteria in the game with a single type of players.
Keywords: coalition stability, Nash equilibrium, weak coalitional equilibrium (WCE). 
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     title = {Two types of players in the endogenous coalition formation model},
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Denis S. Stepanov. Two types of players in the endogenous coalition formation model. Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 2 (2010) no. 2, pp. 79-98. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2010_2_2_a3/

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