Geodesic
Cooperative incentive condition in bioresource management problem
Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 1 (2009) no. 3, pp. 71-86.

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The discrete-time game model related with the bioresource management problem (fish catching) is considered. The center (referee) shares a reservoir between the competitors. The players (countries), which harvest the fish stock are the participants of this game. We assume that there is a migratory exchange between the regions of the reservoir. The Nash and cooperative equilibria are obtained for infinite planning horizon. Time-consistent imputation distribution procedure is considered as a method for maintenance the cooperation. The new condition which offers an incentive to players to keep cooperation is introduced and we call it incentive cooperative condition.
Keywords: dynamic games, bioresource management problem, cooperative equilibrium, time-consistency, imputation distribution procedure. 
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Anna Rettieva. Cooperative incentive condition in bioresource management problem. Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 1 (2009) no. 3, pp. 71-86. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2009_1_3_a4/

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