Geodesic
Equivalence and strategy-proofness of no anonymous priority resource allocation mechanisms
Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 1 (2009) no. 3, pp. 46-70 Cet article a éte moissonné depuis la source Math-Net.Ru

Voir la notice de l'article

We provide characterizations of strategy-proof mechanisms of sequential resource allocation, which are equivalent to mechanisms of direct and reverse priorities. Previously known equivalency of anonymous priority mechanisms is extended on no anonymous case. Equivalency of all no anonymous mechanisms of direct priorities is shown. We provide characterization of class of mechanisms of reverse priorities, that have equivalent mechanisms of direct priorities.
Keywords: resource allocation mechanisms, strategy-proof mechanisms, game theory, planning mechanisms. 
@article{MGTA_2009_1_3_a3,
     author = {Nikolay Korgin},
     title = {Equivalence and strategy-proofness of no anonymous priority resource allocation mechanisms},
     journal = {Matemati\v{c}eska\^a teori\^a igr i e\"e prilo\v{z}eni\^a},
     pages = {46--70},
     year = {2009},
     volume = {1},
     number = {3},
     language = {ru},
     url = {http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2009_1_3_a3/}
}
TY  - JOUR
AU  - Nikolay Korgin
TI  - Equivalence and strategy-proofness of no anonymous priority resource allocation mechanisms
JO  - Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ
PY  - 2009
SP  - 46
EP  - 70
VL  - 1
IS  - 3
UR  - http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2009_1_3_a3/
LA  - ru
ID  - MGTA_2009_1_3_a3
ER  - 
%0 Journal Article
%A Nikolay Korgin
%T Equivalence and strategy-proofness of no anonymous priority resource allocation mechanisms
%J Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ
%D 2009
%P 46-70
%V 1
%N 3
%U http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2009_1_3_a3/
%G ru
%F MGTA_2009_1_3_a3
Nikolay Korgin. Equivalence and strategy-proofness of no anonymous priority resource allocation mechanisms. Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 1 (2009) no. 3, pp. 46-70. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2009_1_3_a3/

[1] Burkov V.N., Gorgidze I.I., Novikov D.A., Yusupov B.S., Modeli i mekhanizmy raspredeleniya zatrat i dokhodov v rynochnoi ekonomike, IPU RAN, M., 1997, 61 pp.

[2] Burkov V.N., Danev B., Enaleev A.K. i dr., Bolshie sistemy: modelirovanie organizatsionnykh mekhanizmov, Nauka, M., 1989, 248 pp.

[3] Burkov V.N., Korgin N.A., Novikov D.A., Vvedenie v teoriyu upravleniya organizatsionnymi sistemami, Pod red. chl.-korr. RAN D.A. Novikova, Librokom, M., 2009, 264 pp.

[4] Intrilligator M., Matematicheskie metody optimizatsii i ekonomicheskaya teoriya, Progress, M., 1975, 606 pp.

[5] Mulin E., Kooperativnoe prinyatie reshenii: Aksiomy i modeli, Per. s angl., Mir, M., 1991, 464 pp.

[6] Novikov D.A., Teoriya upravleniya organizatsionnymi sistemami, 2-e izdanie, Fizmatlit, M., 2007, 584 pp.

[7] Barbera S., Jackson M., Neme A., “Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules”, Games and Economic Behavior, 18:1 (1997), 1–21 | DOI | MR | Zbl

[8] Bossert W., Weymark J.A., Social choice (new developments), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition, eds. Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008

[9] Mas-Collel A., Whinston M. D., Green J. R., Microeconomic theory, Oxford Univ. Press, N.Y., 1995, 981 pp.

[10] Sprumont Y., “The division problem with single-peaked preferences: A characterization of the uniform rule”, Econometrica, 59 (1991), 509–519 | DOI | MR | Zbl