Full-information best-choice game with two stops

Anna Ivashko

Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 1 (2009) no. 3, pp. 31-45.

Résumé

We consider a full-information best-choice game in which each player wants to hire two secretaries. The aim of a player is to maximize the sum of expected applicant' quality values. Two models are considered: m-person best-choice game with the possibility of an applicant refusing an offer and two-person best-choice game with dominant player. The optimal strategies are received. We prove that in the best-choice game with the possibility of an applicant refusing an offer the players' payoffs don't depend on total number of players in the game.

Détail

Keywords: best-choice game, optimal strategy, multistage game, multiple stopping.

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