Geodesic
Multistage networking games with full information
Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 1 (2009) no. 2, pp. 66-81 Cet article a éte moissonné depuis la source Math-Net.Ru

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Multistage networking games with full information are considered. The network structure which connects the players is defined at every time moment. We assume that each verge has a utility (the player's profit form the connection with another player), and players have a right to change network structure at every stage. The approach to define optimal players' behavior is proposed.
Keywords: network, networking games, utility, Shapley value, Nash equilibrium. 
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Leon Petrosjan; Artem Sedakov. Multistage networking games with full information. Matematičeskaâ teoriâ igr i eë priloženiâ, Tome 1 (2009) no. 2, pp. 66-81. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/MGTA_2009_1_2_a3/

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