Geodesic
Power analysis of voting by count and account
Kybernetika, Tome 42 (2006) no. 4, pp. 483-493

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Using players’ Shapley–Shubik power indices, Peleg [4] proved that voting by count and account is more egalitarian than voting by account. In this paper, we show that a stronger shift in power takes place when the voting power of players is measured by their Shapley–Shubik indices. Moreover, we prove that analogous power shifts also occur with respect to the absolute Banzhaf and the absolute Johnston power indices.
Classification : 91A12, 91B12, 91B14
Keywords: cooperative games; voting; power indices 
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     author = {Hirokawa, Midori and Vlach, Milan},
     title = {Power analysis of voting by count and account},
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     zbl = {1249.91007},
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Hirokawa, Midori; Vlach, Milan. Power analysis of voting by count and account. Kybernetika, Tome 42 (2006) no. 4, pp. 483-493. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/KYB_2006__42_4_a7/