Geodesic
Modeling the interaction between innovator and investor in terms of game theory
News of the Kabardin-Balkar scientific center of RAS, no. 1 (2018), pp. 21-27.

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We propose a game model of interaction between the investor and the innovator with the possibility of co-financing the project on the innovator side. The optimal solution in such a game is found by the method of inverse induction. When the investor chooses a certain type of project, the solution of the problem can be found in mixed strategies.
Keywords: innovation process, decision making under uncertainty, game theory, investments. 
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E. G. Derkach; Z. Z. Ivanov; A. O. Gurtuev. Modeling the interaction between innovator and investor in terms of game theory. News of the Kabardin-Balkar scientific center of RAS, no. 1 (2018), pp. 21-27. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/IZKAB_2018_1_a0/

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