Geodesic
A model for investor-expert interaction in the innovation
News of the Kabardin-Balkar scientific center of RAS, no. 6-2 (2017), pp. 73-78 Cet article a éte moissonné depuis la source Math-Net.Ru

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We propose a model of investor-expert interaction in the system of innovation investment. The model is a recurring game with imperfect information, deferred revenues and Bayesian re-evaluation of players’ own type. Different equilibria for some qualitatively different configurations of initial values of budgets, risk attitude, and distribution of player types are found.
Keywords: : innovation process, game theory, economic mechanisms, adverse selection, information asymmetry, Bayesian equilibrium. 
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A. O. Gurtuev; E. G. Derkach; Z. Z. Ivanov. A model for investor-expert interaction in the innovation. News of the Kabardin-Balkar scientific center of RAS, no. 6-2 (2017), pp. 73-78. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/IZKAB_2017_6-2_a8/

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