Geodesic
On game-theoretic characterisation of stochastic independence
Diskretnaya Matematika, Tome 22 (2010) no. 1, pp. 115-125 
V. L. Kreps. On game-theoretic characterisation of stochastic independence. Diskretnaya Matematika, Tome 22 (2010) no. 1, pp. 115-125. http://geodesic.mathdoc.fr/item/DM_2010_22_1_a8/
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Voir la notice de l'article provenant de la source Math-Net.Ru

Dropping the assumption of the stochastic independence of players' randomised choices in non-cooperative games, we introduce the notion of a type of dependence. It is proved that the stochastic independence is the unique type of dependence for which any finite non-cooperative game has a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.

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